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NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
RESULTING SOLELY FROM PROPERTY DAMAGE IS NOT
A COMPENSABLE INJURY. Dobbins v. Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission, 338 Md. 341, 658 A.2d 675
(1995).
I. INTRODUCTION
Up to one-half of all Americans will suffer from a mental
disorder at some point during their lifetime.' In a typical year, fifty-
one million Americans will be affected by mental illness. 2 If these
disorders are not properly recognized and treated, society will be left
paying the economic and social costs.3 Maryland courts, however,
have never compensated a plaintiff for emotional distress resulting
solely from negligently inflicted property damage.
4
In order to prevent fabricated claims, recovery for emotional
injuries was traditionally granted only if the injuries followed physical
impact.5 During the last century, however, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland began to move away from this harsh rule that denied
recovery to individuals with legitimate claims. 6 In an effort to com-
pensate a plaintiff who experiences genuine emotional injuries but to
bar claims that are frivolous, Maryland's high court placed two
separate requirements on plaintiffs before they could recover for
negligently inflicted emotional distress. 7 A plaintiff must first dem-
onstrate that the mental injury has manifested into a "physical
1. See Fifty-one Million Americans Suffer; Costs Society $160 Billion, Yet Eminent
Physicians Said Mental Illnesses Can Be Successfully Treated, PRNewswire,
October 2, 1995, available in WESTLAW, PRWIREPLUS Database.
2. See id.
3. See id. "Under-recognition and under-treatment of mental disorders is a serious
problem that burdens society with a great cost both socially and economically."
Id.
4. See, e.g., Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 338 Md. 341,
351, 658 A.2d 675, 679-80 (1995); see also Zeigler v. F Street Corp, 248 Md.
223, 226, 235 A.2d 703, 705 (1967); State ex rel. Aronoff v. Baltimore Transit
Co., 197 Md. 528, 540, 80 A.2d 13, 18 (1951).
5. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 89, at
319-20 (1935).
6. See infra notes 39-57, 93-98 and accompanying text. If individuals have
legitimate claims, they should be compensated for their injuries. Cf., e.g.,
Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 73 So. 205 (Ala. Ct. App. 1916).
7. See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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injury."" Next, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury was a
foreseeable outcome of the defendant's conduct. 9 In recent years,
however, the court has moved towards relaxing one or both of these
requirements .10
In Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission," the
court explained its position on relaxing these two requirements. In
Dobbins, a pipe under the defendant's control broke on two separate
occasions flooding the plaintiffs' residence.12 The defendant's negli-
gent conduct caused property damage to the residence, and the
plaintiff alleged that she subsequently suffered emotional distress. 3
The Court of Appeals of Maryland denied recovery for the mental
injuries asserting that the requirement of foreseeability had not been
relaxed and that the emotional injury sustained by the plaintiff did
not satisfy the existing foreseeability requirement. 4 The court held
that under Maryland law a plaintiff cannot be compensated for
emotional injuries that stem solely from the negligent destruction of
the plaintiff's property. 5
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The ability to recover for emotional distress was traditionally
predicated on the requirement that the plaintiff also suffered a direct
physical impact. 6 Most courts, including Maryland courts, 17 have
rejected this requirement and have adopted the "physical injury"
rule.' 8 Under this rule, emotional distress is equated with a physical
injury if the plaintiff can prove a physical manifestation. 19 Recovery
is far from certain, however, as the plaintiff must also prove that
the physical manifestation was proximately caused by the defendant's
negligent act.20 Thus, while the adoption of the broader "physical
8. See, e.g., Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 497, 408 A.2d 728, 732 (1979);
Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 404, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933); Green v.
TA. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 83, 73 A. 688, 693 (1909).
9. See, e.g., Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 334, 503 A.2d
1333, 1340 (1986).
10. See Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found., Inc., 329 Md. 709, 735-36, 621 A.2d
872, 885 (1993).
11. 338 Md. 341, 658 A.2d 675 (1995).
12. See id. at 342-43, 658 A.2d at 675-76.
13. See id. at 342-44, 658 A.2d at 675-76.
14. See id. at 350-51, 658 A.2d at 679-80.
15. See id. at 351, 658 A.2d at 679-80.
16. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 58-92 and accompanying text.
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injury" rule appears to increase the plaintiff's likelihood of success,
proving proximate cause is a high hurdle.
A. Development of the "Physical Injury" Rule
1. Nationwide Overview
Historically, courts have been reluctant to compensate individuals
for interference with their emotional well-being. 21 Gradually, however,
courts began to recognize a responsibility to compensate people for
their injuries, regardless of whether the injury was physical or emo-
tional." Therefore, if a plaintiff could show a physical impact to
their body, they would become eligible to recover damages for
emotional distress that resulted from this impact.
23
A majority of courts now recognize that the "physical impact"
rule is unfair and illogical. 24 This recognition is based on the premise
that a person can suffer emotional distress even absent contact with
an object. 2 The majority of states that have abandoned the "physical
impact" rule require plaintiffs to prove only that they have experi-
enced a "physical injury" or physical manifestation as a result of
the defendant's negligence. 6
A minority of states have proceeded even further, rejecting both
the "physical impact" and "physical injury" rule.27 These jurisdic-
21. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
54, at 360 (5th ed. 1984).
22. See, e.g., Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 73 So. 205 (Ala. Ct. App.
1916).
23. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 5, § 89, at 319-20. A physical impact occurs when
a physical object strikes the plaintiff's body. See id.
24. See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Colo. 1978); Vicnire v.
Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 155 (Me. 1979); Payton v. Abbott
Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Young,
384 So. 2d 69, 71 (Miss. 1980); Wyatt v. Gilmore, 290 S.E.2d 790, 793 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1982); Ellington v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 717 P.2d 109, 111 (Okla.
1986); Melton v. Allen, 580 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Or. 1978).
25. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 54, at 364. "[S]o far as substantial justice
is concerned, it would seem that it is possible to have nearly as much assurance
that the mental disturbance is genuine when the plaintiff escapes 'impact' only
by an inch." Id.
26. See, e.g., Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 181 (requiring that physical harm be "man-
ifested by objective symptomatology and substantiated by expert medical tes-
timony").
27. See, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981);
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980); Montinieri v.
Southern New England Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978); Rodrigues
v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (Haw. 1970); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d
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tions require only that the plaintiff show emotional distress as a
result of the defendant's negligence.2 In 1987, the Supreme Court
of Texas adopted this minority view in St. Elizabeth Hospital v.
Garrard.29 In Garrard, a mother gave birth to one healthy male and
one stillborn female ° The female was taken away and disposed of
in an unmarked grave without the parents' consent or knowledge.3
The plaintiffs filed suit alleging negligence, but they did not state
that "the mental anguish manifested itself physically. '3 2 The court
granted recovery, however, emphasizing that "[ilt is well recognized
that certain psychological injuries can be just as severe and debili-
tating as physical injuries." 33 Furthermore, the court noted that the
physical manifestation requirement is an unnecessary restriction in
our current society.
3 4
During the past century, courts have gradually moved away from
the traditional approach which denied individuals recovery for their
emotional injuries. 35 Today, most jurisdictions only require that
765, 772 (Mo. 1983); Johnson v. Supersave Mkts., Inc., 686 P.2d 209, 213
(Mont. 1984); Schultz v. Baberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 113 (Ohio
1983); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1987),
overruled on other grounds by Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (Tex.
1993). See infra note 29 for a detailed discussion of Garrard.
28. See, e.g., Garrard, 730 S.W.2d at 654, overruled on other grounds by Boyles
v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (Tex. 1993). "The distinction between physical
injury and emotional distress is no longer defensible." Id. See infra note 29
for a detailed discussion of Garrard.
29. 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Boyles v. Kerr,
855 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (Tex. 1993). In Garrard, the Supreme Court of Texas
abolished the physical injury requirement and recognized the independent tort
of negligent infliction of mental anguish. See id. at 654. Six years later in
Boyles, the same court "overrule[d] the language of Garrard to the extent that
it recognize[d] an independent right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional
distress." Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 595-96. However, Garrard still stands for the
proposition that in Texas a plaintiff claiming emotional distress no longer has
to "establish a physical manifestation of injury before recovering for that
anguish." Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 487 n.3 (Tex. 1995) (citing
Garrard, 730 S.W.2d at 654).
30. See Garrard, 730 S.W.2d at 654, overruled on other grounds by Boyles v.
Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (Tex. 1993).
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 653. The court explained that the advancement of medical research has
allowed our society to achieve "a much more detailed and useful understanding
of the interaction between mind and body." Id.
34. See id. at 653-54. This type of restriction interferes with an individual's
"freedom from severe emotional distress [which] is an interest ... the law
should serve to protect." Id. at 653. The court reasoned that the justice system
is obligated to compensate people for genuine claims of mental anguish
regardless of whether a physical injury occurs. See id.
35. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs demonstrate that they suffered a "physical injury" as a
result of the negligent act.36 A few jurisdictions still require the harsh
standard of proving a physical impact before granting recovery. 7 On
the opposite end of the spectrum, however, a small minority of
jurisdictions allow a plaintiff to recover after establishing only an
emotional injury as a result of the negligence.38
2. The Rule in Maryland
In the 1909 case of Green v. T.A. Shoemaker, 3 9 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland rejected the "physical impact" rule in favor
of the "physical injury" rule.O In Green, the plaintiff suffered
emotional distress, absent physical impact, as a result of repetitive
blasting in the vicinity of her house.41 Recovery for emotional distress
was previously barred absent physical impact under the rationale that
this rule prevented imaginary or frivolous claims 2 The Green court
rejected this rationale recognizing that a claim of emotional distress
can just as easily be fabricated after a physical impact.43 Thus, the
court granted recovery and adopted the "physical injury" rule.
44
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reaffirmed the "physical
injury" rule in Bowman v. Williams.45 In Bowman, the plaintiff
suffered emotional distress without a physical impact from the fright
of watching a truck negligently collide with the house that he and
his family were currently occupying.4 Applying the holding in Green,
the court allowed recovery asserting that nervous shock is compen-
sable without a physical impact if it results "in some clearly apparent
and substantial physical injury, as manifested by an external condition
36. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
39. 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909).
40. See id. at 83, 73 A. at 693.
41. See id. at 72, 73 A. at 689. During one particular blasting session, "a stone
burst through the roof and ceiling and came down through plaintiff's bed,
mattress, and spring, and broke the slats and rollers. [The stone] weighed 22
pounds." Id. at 73, 73 A. at 689.
42. See id. at 80, 73 A. at 692.
43. See id. "[A] nervous injury arising from actual physical impact is as likely to
be imagined as one resulting from fright without physical impact, and . . .the
former is as capable of simulation as the latter." Id. at 81, 73 A.2d 692.
44. See id. at 83, 73 A. at 693.
45. 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
46. See id. at 399, 165 A. at 182. As a result of watching this accident, the plaintiff
instantaneously fell over and developed a hysterical condition. See id. at 399,
165 A. at 182-83. Furthermore, the plaintiff became very nervous and was not
able to start working again for six months. See id. at 399, 165 A. at 183.
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or by symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, phys-
iological, or mental state." 47
The Court of Appeals of Maryland further clarified the holdings
of Green and Bowman in Vance v. Vance.48 In Vance, the court had
to determine if a plaintiff exhibited a "plysical injury ' 49 after she
was informed that her marriage was void. 0 The court opined that
the "physical injury" rule, adopted in Green, was the "modern
trend"'" and that the standard applied in Bowman was the rule in
Maryland.12 The Vance court further explored the "physical injury"
rule by analyzing the four ways a plaintiff may prove that emotional
distress caused a "physical injury.''" "The first three categories
pertain to manifestations of a physical injury through evidence of
an external condition or by symptoms of a pathological or physio-
logical state."5s4 The fourth category, clarified by the Vance court,
allows recovery for emotional distress if the plaintiff has "[p]roof
of a 'physical injury' by evidence indicative of a 'mental state."'"5
The court of appeals defined the word "physical" as an "injury for
which recovery is sought[, and which] is capable of objective deter-
mination." '5 6 The Vance court held that the plaintiff's symptoms of
47. Id at 404, 165 A. at 184.
48. 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979).
49. One witness testified that the plaintiff "was in a state of emotional collapse."
Id. at 493, 408 A.2d at 730. Another witness testified that the plaintiff was
emotionally depressed and "a wreck." See id. at 494, 408 A.2d at 730.
Furthermore, the plaintiff testified at trial and asserted that she was unable to
function and believed that she was on the verge of a nervous breakdown and
had symptoms of an ulcer. See id. at 493, 408 A.2d at 730.
50. See id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734. The plaintiff married the defendant under the
assumption that the defendant was legally divorced from his first wife. See id.
at 492, 409 A.2d at 728. After an 18 year marriage, the defendant and plaintiff
separated. See id. The plaintiff filed for a divorce and asked the court to grant
her alimony and child support. See id. In response, the defendant filed a
motion to annul the marriage because he had never divorced his first wife. See
id
51. Id at 497, 408 A.2d at 732.
52. See id. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733; see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
53. See id. at 500-01, 408 A.2d at 733-34.
54. Id at 500, 408 A.2d at 733. These categories were created for the purpose of
ensuring that plaintiffs demonstrate objective evidence of an injury. See id. By
having these requirements the courts can "guard against feigned claims." Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733-34. The court recognized that this is not a
dictionary definition of "physical." See id. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733. Nonethe-
less, with this decision, Maryland followed many other jurisdictions that utilize
a similar definition of "physical." See, e.g., id. at 500-01, 408 A.2d at 734;
see also Petition of United States, 418 F.2d 264, 269 (lst Cir. 1969) (depression,
emotional upset and inability to continue working at sea); D'Ambra v. United
States, 396 F. Supp. 1180, 1183 (D.L.R.I. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 275 (lst Cir.
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crying, shock, insomnia, ulcer, depression, and deterioration of phys-
ical appearance were objectively determinable and thus satisfied the
"physical injury" rule. 57
B. Proximate Cause
Once physical manifestations are proved, however, recovery may
still be denied unless the plaintiff also satisfies the elements of
proximate cause and foreseeability. 58 That is, the resulting harm must
be caused by and be a foreseeable consequence of the negligent act.59
Absent such proof, the plaintiff will not be compensated.
1. National Overview
a. The Compensability of Emotional Distress Resulting from
Negligent Property Damage
Generally, the majority of jurisdictions have denied compensa-
tion for emotional distress caused by the negligent damage to a
person's property. 6 Courts deny compensation because the result of
emotional distress is not foreseeable when the negligence only causes
damage to property.6' A few jurisdictions have allowed recovery,
however, in instances in which damage to property causes subsequent
1975) (psychoneurosis, loss of appetite, insomnia, nightmares of accident);
Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. 1970) (loss of weight, inability to
perform household chores, extreme nervousness and irritability).
57. See Vance, 286 Md. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734. The court ruled that the plaintiff's
mental distress satisfied the fourth category since the plaintiff "suffered an
objectively manifested, definite nervous disorder." Id.; see also Belcher v. T.
Rowe Price Found., Inc., 329 Md. 709, 730-31, 621 A.2d 872, 882-83 (1993).
58. See infra notes 60-92 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 69-70, 73-92 and accompanying text.
60. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Recovery for Mental Shock or Distress in
Connection with Injury to or Interference with Tangible Property, 28 A.L.R.2d
1070, 1089 (1953); see also, e.g., Anders v. Tremont Lumber Co., 129 So. 649
(La. 1930) (affirming trial court's decision to bar emotional distress damages
resulting from property damage caused by a lumber company); Smith v. Clough,
796 P.2d 592 (Nev. 1990) (denying recovery for emotional distress when a car
ran into the front of a person's house while he was at home).
61. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hughes, 194 So. 842 (Ala. 1940). The court
held that recovery will be denied when emotional distress results solely from
damage to property. See id. at 847. Recovery will be granted only "where
there has been a physical injury to a person, under circumstances warranting
the recovery of compensatory damages therefore, mental suffering, which is
natural incident thereto, furnishes one of the elements of recoverable damages."
Id.
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emotional suffering6 2 For example, in Rodrigues v. State,63 the
Supreme Court of Hawaii had to determine if the plaintiff could
recover for emotional distress when the plaintiff's house was negli-
gently flooded as a result of a clogged drainage culvert.6" The court
recognized that it was foreseeable that damage to property could
cause a subsequent emotional injury. 65 As with all negligence cases,
the court noted, an individual must avoid behaviors that might result
in foreseeable injuries including mental distress. 6 The case was re-
manded to the trial court to determine if the plaintiff's injury "was
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act.' '67
b. Establishing Proximate Cause
Courts have established two contrasting theories to determine if
a defendant's negligent conduct was the proximate cause of a plain-
tiff's injury." The first theory is the foreseeability test. 69 Under this
majority viewpoint, a defendant is held liable for an injury if the
consequence was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's
conduct.7 0 The second theory, embraced by a small minority of
jurisdictions, is the direct tracing test.71 Under this theory, a defendant
is liable for any consequences that can be directly traced to the
original act.
7 2
62. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520-21 (Haw. 1970).
63. 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970).
64. See id. at 520-21.
65. See id. at 521.
66. See id.
67. Id. Made up of a cross-section of the community, the jury is in the best
position to apply the reasonable man standard to determine if a plaintiff's
mental distress should be compensated. See id. at 521 n.8.
68. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 43, at 280-301; see also Pitre v. Opelousas
Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1160 (La. 1988).
69. See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876); Cone v.
Inter County Tel. Co., 40 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1949); Engle v. Director Gen., 133
N.E. 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1921); Shideler v. Habiger, 243 P.2d 211 (Kan. 1952).
70. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 43, at 281-82 ("[L]iability is restricted to
the scope of the original risk created .... ").
71. See, e.g., Pitre, 530 So. 2d at 1160; Williams v. Brennan, 99 N.E. 516 (Mass.
1912); Burlington & M.R. Co. v. Westover, 4 Neb. 268 (1876); cf. State v.
James, 144 N.W. 216 (Minn. 1913).
72. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 43, at 294-95. "'Direct' consequences are
those which follow in sequence from the effect of the defendant's act upon
conditions existing and forces already in operation at the time, without inter-
vention of any external forces which come into active operation later." Id. §
43, at 294. Furthermore, the direct tracing test is adopted by almost all courts
"when unforeseeable harm to a plaintiff follows an impact upon his person."
Pitre, 530 So. 2d at 1160.
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2. Proximate Cause in Maryland
Maryland, relying heavily on the foreseeability test, 73 generally
denies recovery for emotional distress that results from witnessing
damage to property.74 This is illustrated by State ex rel. Aronoff v.
Baltimore Transit Co. 75 In Aronoff, the plaintiff was supervising his
employees who were installing windows. 76 A street car negligently
collided with his truck and shattered the glass therein. 7 7 A loud noise
resulted causing the plaintiff to instantaneously have a heart attack
and die within an hour and a half of the accident.78 The court denied
recovery because the resulting injury was not an outcome that was
foreseeable.79 The court recognized that because the risk of injury in
this case was an unusual and extraordinary occurrence, allowing the
decedent to recover would create a duty that would "place an
unreasonable burden upon users of highways." 0
In Zeigler v. F Street Corp., 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
was presented with a case analogous to Aronoff.8 2 In Zeigler, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, who owned the adjacent prop-
erty, caused property damage by negligently depositing dirt and debris
on the plaintiffs' property. 3 The plaintiffs further alleged that this
property damage caused the decedent to become very upset, which
73. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., State ex rel. Aronoff v. Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md. 528, 539-
40, 80 A.2d 13, 18 (1951).
75. 197 Md. 528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951).
76. See id. at 529-30, 80 A.2d at 13-14.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 530-31, 80 A.2d at 14. The plaintiff "was detrimentally affected,
was greatly shocked and frightened, and sustained a severe nervous upset and
emotional strain, precipitating a heart attack from which he died." See id. at
531, 80 A.2d at 14 (emphasis in original). The official cause of death was
coronary thrombosis. See id.
79. See id. at 539, 80 A.2d at 18. The court explained that the injury could not
"have been contemplated as a natural and probable consequence thereof." Id.
(quoting Baltimore City Passenger Ry. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74, 81 (1883)). The
Aronoff court concluded that a person does not ordinarily die as a result of
noise, excitement, and confusion. See id. at 539-40, 80 A.2d at 18. Furthermore,
the court, in deciding to deny compensation because the decedent's emotional
injury stemmed solely from property damage, emphasized that the decedent
was standing inside the store when the accident occurred and the store had no
glass in the windows at the time of the accident. See id. at 539, 80 A.2d at
18.
80. Id. at 540, 80 A.2d at 18 (quoting Cote v. Litawa, 71 A.2d 792, 795 (N.H.
1950)). After the court noted that no duty was breached, it recognized that
the plaintiffs' complaint had to be dismissed. See id. (construing Jackson v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 176 Md. 1, 4, 3 A.2d 719, 721 (1939)).
81. 248 Md. 223, 235 A.2d 703 (1967).
82. See id. at 225, 235 A.2d at 705.
83. See id. at 224-25, 235 A.2d at 704-05.
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ultimately led to his death, 8The court denied recovery based on the
general rule established in Aronoff that, ordinarily, no compensation
will be given for emotional distress that results from property dam-
age.85 In dicta the court suggested, however, that if the property
damage was "inspired by fraud, malice, or like motives, mental
suffering [would be] a proper element of damage." 8 6 Furthermore,
property damage that was caused by intentional conduct or conduct
that places a plaintiff's personal safety in danger would also be an
exception to the general rule denying recovery
8 7
The foreseeability requirement was clarified in Henley v. Prince
George's County.88 In Henley, a wrongful death suit was brought
against the defendants for allowing a recently released inmate to
remain on their property when they allegedly knew of his violent
intentions. 9 The court held that liability would attach if there was a
sufficient nexus between the negligent act and the subsequent injury.9
The court emphasized, however, that compensation would be denied
for remote consequences The case was remanded to the trial court
for a determination of liability. 92
C. Recent Development in Maryland
The court of appeals revisited the requirements needed to prove
negligent infliction of emotional distress in Belcher v. T. Rowe Price
Foundation, Inc?3 In Belcher, the court granted relief in a workers'
compensation claim for a purely psychological injury.9 The plaintiff
suffered from emotional problems after a three-ton beam broke loose
84. See id. at 225, 235 A.2d at 705.
85. See id. at 226, 235 A.2d at 705.
86. Id
87. See id. In Zeigler, none of these exceptions existed; therefore, the plaintiffs
were not able to recover. See id.
88. 305 Md. 320, 503 A.2d 1333 (1986).
89. See id. at 324-27, 503 A.2d at 1335-37. After a criminal trial, the released
inmate was convicted of the murder of the plaintiff. See id. at 327 n.1, 503
A.2d at 1336 n.1.
90. See id. at 334, 503 A.2d at 1340.
91. See id. at 333, 503 A.2d at 1340. "The concept that all persons owe a duty
to all other person to use reasonable care to protect them from harm must be
limited if we are to avoid liability for unreasonably remote consequences." Id.
Furthermore, the court emphasized that when determining foreseeability the
current societal standards should always be taken into consideration. See id.
at 334, 503 A.2d at 1340.
92. See id. at 340-41, 503 A.2d at 1343-44. "[Tlhe issue of proximate cause ...
[is] properly resolved by trial not by summary judgment." Id. at 340, 503
Ai.d at 1343.
93. 329 Md. 709, 621 A.2d 872 (1993).
94. See id. at 745-46, 621 A.2d at 890.
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from a construction crane, crashed through the roof, and landed five
feet from where the plaintiff was sitting.
9 Utilizing tort principles,9
the court allowed recovery after determining that the plaintiff's injury
qualified under the definition of "physical injury" as explained in
Vance?7 Furthermore, the Belcher court recognized the importance
of relaxing the requirements on compensating plaintiffs for their
mental distress because emotional injuries are as real and disabling
as bodily injuries.98
Nevertheless, the decision in Belcher relaxing the "physical in-
jury" rule as a requirement for compensation of mental distress, did
not clearly state whether the holding was meant also to relax the
foreseeability test. In Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission," the Court of Appeals of Maryland specifically ad-
dressed the relaxation of the foreseeability requirement.
III. THE INSTANT CASE
On January 16, 1988, a pipe broke flooding the residence of
Scheller M. and Mildred H. Dobbins.' ® On September 29, 1989, a
95. See id. at 713, 621 A.2d at 874. "The sound was deafening; it was [as) if a
bomb had exploded." Id.
96. The court applied tort principles after making two conclusions. See id. at 722,
621 A.2d at 878. First, the legislature did not demonstrate an intention to
exclude compensability of an accidental injury that results only in emotional
harm. See id. Second, the workers' compensation case law lacked a definite
answer. See id.
97. See id. at 745-46, 621 A.2d at 890. The court concluded that the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff were "capable of objective determination." Id. at
746, 621 A.2d at 890. The plaintiff "suffered sleep disturbances, nightmares,
heart palpitations, chest pain, and headaches as a result of the occurrence."
Id at 713, 621 A.2d at 874; see also supra notes 48-57 and accompanying
text.
98. See id. at 735-36, 621 A.2d at 885.
We have traced the development of the law of Maryland as interpreted
in our judicial opinions concerned with liability for negligently inflicted
mental harm, from a standard limiting such liability to purely physical
trauma to a standard permitting recovery for damages for trauma
resulting from purely emotional distress that can be objectively deter-
mined. The recognition that a person should be compensated for
mental harm resulting from the negligent act of another is in accord
with the ever increasing knowledge in the specialties which have
evolved in the field of medicine and in the disciplines of psychiatry
and psychology. Persons suffering from severe mental distress are no
longer simply warehoused in Bedlam type institutions; they are treated
by medical experts at no small cost. We are now aware that mental
injuries can be as real as broken bones and may result in even greater
disabilities.
Id
99. 338 Md. 341, 658 A.2d 675 (1995).
100. See id. at 342-43, 658 A.2d at 675-76. Scheller and Mildred Dobbins were
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second pipe broke and the Dobbinses' house was flooded for the
second time. 0' Both of the pipes were under the control of the
Defendant, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC). 10 2
As a result of the floods, the Dobbinses sustained property damage. 103
Ms. Dobbins also alleged that she suffered emotional injuries as a
direct result of the flood.3 o4 The Dobbinses filed suit in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County alleging negligence, trespass, and loss
of consortium, and requesting compensation for property damage
and "personal injury."'0 5 Ms. Dobbins admitted in a deposition that
the WSSC did not damage her house intentionally. io1 She further
conceded "that the flooding had not directly injured her in any
physical way."', 7
WSSC filed a motion for summary judgment, and after a hearing
their motion was denied. 108 Judge S. Michael Pincus of the Circuit
husband and wife. See id. at 342, 658 A.2d at 675. Their residence, which
they owned and occupied, was located in Gaithersburg, Maryland. See id. at
343, 658 A.2d at 675.
101. See id. at 343, 658 A.2d at 676. "The Dobbinses alleged that on this occasion
'[t]he great quantity of water caused the entire basement floor to heave itself
upwards lifting the entire structure above it and causing structural damage to
their home."' Id. (quoting Joint Record Extract at 4, Dobbins v. Washington
Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 338 Md. 341, 658 A.2d 675 (1995) (Sept. Term
1994 No. 122)).
102. See id. at 342-43, 658 A.2d at 675-76. According to the Dobbinses' second
amended complaint, the pipes were "installed, maintained and were the property
of the [d]efendant, WSSC; in connection with supplying water service to the
[p]laintiffs and others in Montgomery County, Maryland, the [diefendant ha[d]
installed a system of water mains, pipes and connections." Joint Record Extract
at 2, Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 338 Md. 341, 658
A.2d 675 (1995) (Sept. Term 1994 No. 122).
103. See Dobbins, 338 Md. at 342-43, 658 A.2d at 675-76. The property damage
claim had been settled by the parties and, therefore, was not addressed by the
court. See id. at 343, 658 A.2d at 676.
104. See id. at 342-43, 658 A.2d at 676. In their complaint the Dobbinses stated:
[Als a direct result of the damage caused to the home, the Plaintiff,
MILDRED DOBBINS, received severe, painful and permanent injuries
to her body as well as severe and protracted shock to her nervous
system, all of which have caused her and will continue to cause her
great pain and mental anguish.
Id. at 343, 658 A.2d at 676 (quoting Joint Record Extract at 7, Dobbins v.
Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 338 Md. 341, 658 A.2d 675 (1995)
(Sept. Term 1994 No. 122)).
105. See id. at 342, 658 A.2d at 675.
106. See id. at 343, 658 A.2d at 676.
107. Id Ms. Dobbins also stated that she never went downstairs into the flooded
basement but rather remained upstairs. See id. Nonetheless, Ms. Dobbins's
psychiatrist clearly stated that the flooding was "the precipitant for her
psychiatric . . . problems." See id. at 344, 658 A.2d at 676.
108. See id. at 343-44, 658 A.2d at 676.
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Court for Montgomery County acknowledged that the modern trend
is "away from a bright-line rule barring recovery for emotional
distress, and toward a case-by-case inquiry into the natural and
expected result of the defendant's particular conduct."' 9 Before a
settlement conference, however, summary judgment was granted by
Circuit Court Judge for Montgomery County, James L. Ryan," 0 who
ruled that the Dobbinses had no cause of action."' The Dobbinses
subsequently appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land." 2 The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior
to intermediate appellate review."'
The court began its analysis of the primary issue" 4 by examining
the applicable case law dealing with negligent infliction of emotional
109. Id at 344, 658 A.2d at 676. Judge Pincus decided that a jury should decide
whether the injuries that Ms. Dobbins sustained "were the natural and expected
result of the defendant's alleged negligence." Id.
110. After Judge Pincus denied WSSC's motion for summary judgment, there was
a calendar call before the Administrative Judge for Montgomery County, Paul
Weinstein. See Appellants' Brief at 1, Dobbins v. Washington Suburban
Sanitary Comm'n, 338 Md. 341, 658 A.2d 675 (1995) (Sept. Term 1994 No.
122). The Administrative Judge questioned if a cause of action existed in this
case. See id. The parties then appeared in front of Judge Ryan in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County. See id.
111. See Dobbins, 338 Md. at 344, 658 A.2d at 676. Judge Ryan also stated: 'It
appears that some emotional problems have developed with the Plaintiff or
Plaintiffs, but by law the Plaintiffs' claims for mental anguish and emotional
upset and distress cannot be chargeable to the Defendant in this case."' Id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Before the court of appeals addressed the merits, it reviewed the procedures
for granting summary judgment. See id. at 344-45, 658 A.2d at 676-77. First,
the court of appeals stated "that a court may grant a motion for summary
judgment 'in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response
show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter
of a law."' Id. (quoting MD. R. CIv. P. 2-501(e)). Second, the court asserted
that when deciding a motion for summary judgment a court cannot decide any
facts in dispute but rather rule on the motion as a matter of law. See id. at
345, 658 A.2d at 677 (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34,
43, 656 A.2d 307, 311 (1995)); Southland Co. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 712,
633 A.2d 84, 87 (1993); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737,
625 A.2d 1005, 1010 (1993). Third, the court explained that when ruling on a
motion for summary judgment a judge must evaluate the facts in the light
most favorable to the party against whom judgment is entered. See id. (citing
Beard v. American Agency, 314 Md. 235, 246, 550 A.2d 677, 682 (1988);
Kramer v. Bally's Park Place, 311 Md. 387, 389, 535 A.2d 466, 467 (1988);
Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 621-22, 495 A.2d 838, 839
(1985)). Finally, the court opined that "[i]n reviewing the trial court's decision
• .. we must determine whether the court was legally correct to grant summary
judgment." Id. (citing Lane, 338 Md. at 43, 656 A.2d at 311; Southland, 332
Md. at 712, 633 A.2d at 87-88).
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distress. " 5 First, the court acknowledged that the traditional rule in
Maryland was that a plaintiff cannot recover for emotional injuries
which result from negligent damage to a plaintiff's property. 16 Fur-
thermore, the court recognized that because Ms. Dobbins did not
allege in her complaint that she feared for her safety or that her
safety was in jeopardy, she could not invoke the personal safety
exception established in Zeigler v. F Street Corp."
7
Next, the court rejected the Dobbinses' contention that the
holding of Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Foundation, Inc.1 8 overruled
the traditional rule of denying recovery as a matter of law by relaxing
the foreseeability requirement .19 The Dobbinses asserted that "re-
covery for emotional injuries should be limited only by a proximate
cause analysis involving a fact-specific inquiry into the foreseeability
of the harm."'' 20 The WSSC contended, however, that the holding
of Belcher did not disturb the traditional rule prohibiting recovery. 21
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals
reasserted the two distinct and separate requirements which have been
used to limit the compensability of mental suffering. 2 2 First, the
court reviewed Maryland's transition from the "physical impact"
rule to the "physical injury" rule. 23 The court recognized that if a
plaintiff can establish a "physical injury" that is capable of objective
determination, recovery will be granted even absent a physical im-
pact. 12 Second, the court reviewed the rules of foreseeability that
115. See id. at 345-51, 658 A.2d at 677-80.
116. See id. at 345, 658 A.2d at 677 (citing Zeigler v. F Street Corp., 248 Md. 223,
235 A.2d 703 (1967); State ex rel. Aronoff v. Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md.
528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951)).
117. See id. In Zeigler, 248 Md. at 226, 235 A.2d at 705, the court of appeals
stated that if "the personal safety of the decedent was put in jeopardy"
recovery might have been allowed. Furthermore, the Zeigler court recognized
that if "the act occasioning the injury to the property is inspired by fraud,
malice, or like motives, mental suffering is a proper element of damages." Id.
118. 329 Md. 709, 621 A.2d 872 (1993).
119. See Dobbins, 338 Md. at 346, 658 A.2d at 677. For a discussion of the
foreseeability requirement see supra notes 60-92 and accompanying text.
120. Dobbins, 338 Md. at 346, 658 A.2d at 677. The Dobbinses also contended
that the holding in Belcher barred the WSSC from asserting that the injuries
sustained by Ms. Dobbins were unforeseeable. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 347-51, 658 A.2d at 677-80.
123. See id. at 347-48, 658 A.2d at 677-78; see also supra notes 39-57 and accom-
panying text.
124. See Dobbins, 338 Md. at 347-48, 658 A.2d at 678 (quoting Belcher v. T. Rowe
Price Found., Inc., 329 Md. 709, 734-35, 621 A.2d 872, 884-85 (1993)). By
requiring a "physical injury" that is capable of objective determination, the
court of appeals believed that fabricated claims would be adequately minimized.
See id. at 347-48, 658 A.2d at 678 (quoting Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found.,
Inc., 329 Md. 709, 734-35, 621 A.2d 872, 884-85 (1993)).
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are utilized by the Maryland courts. 125 The court reaffirmed Mary-
land's decision "to avoid liability for unreasonably remote
consequences" 126 and adopted section 435(2) of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts. 27 Under section 435(2), recovery is denied when "it
appears 'highly extraordinary' that the negligent conduct should have
brought about the harm."12
8
Relying on the foreseeability doctrine, the court of appeals
emphasized that recovery for emotional distress resulting solely from
damage to property would be barred. 29 The court determined that
mental suffering caused solely by damage to a person's property
"was 'an unusual and extraordinary result' and that it should not
'have been contemplated as a natural and probable consequence.'"130
Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court correctly
followed the traditional foreseeability rules when it granted summary
judgment. 31 Furthermore, the court noted that the lower court ac-
cepted the fact that Ms. Dobbins had a "physical injury" capable
of objective determination. 13 2 Therefore, when Judge Ryan ruled in
favor of the WSSC, he was clearly denying compensation because
Ms. Dobbins's injury was unforeseeable.'33
Nonetheless, the Dobbinses contended that the foreseeability
rules had been liberalized by the holding in Belcher. 114 The court of
appeals noted, however, that the Belcher court was only relaxing the
125. See id. at 348, 658 A.2d at 678; see also supra notes 88-92 and accompanying
text.
126. Dobbins, 338 Md. at 348, 658 A.2d at 678 (quoting Henley v. Prince George's
County, 305 Md. 320, 333, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986)).
127. Id. (adopting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965)).
128. Id. (quoting Henley, 305 Md. at 334, 503 A.2d at 1340). A negligent actor
should only be held liable for an injury which could have been forecasted
before the negligent event occurred. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
435(2) cmt. d (1965).
129. See Dobbins, 338 Md. at 349, 658 A.2d at 679.
130. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Aronoff v. Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md. 528, 540,
80 A.2d 13, 18 (1951)).
131. See id. The court emphasized that refusal to compensate Ms. Dobbins "was
not based on the 'physical injury' rule or any concern that Ms. Dobbins's
emotional injuries may have been feigned." Id. at 349-50, 658 A.2d at 679.
132. See id. at 350, 658 A.2d at 679. According to Ms. Dobbins's psychiatrist, Paul
A. Silver, M.D., Ms. Dobbins's symptoms during the four years following the
second flood were "significant feelings of depression, difficulty concentrating,
and completing tasks, as well as anxiety regarding social activities." Joint
Record Extract at 32-33, Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n,
338 Md. 341, 658 A.2d 675 (1995) (Sept. Term 1994 No. 122). Also, the
psychiatrist concluded that these symptoms were caused by the water main
breaks. See Dobbins, 338 Md. at 344, 658 A.2d at 676.
133. See id. at 349-50, 658 A.2d at 679.
134. See id. at 350, 658 A.2d at 679; see also supra note 98.
"physical injury" rule.' The court was, therefore, bound to follow
the traditional rule established in State ex rel. Aronoff v. Baltimore
Transit Co.:'36
(1) ordinarily, emotional injuries are not the "consequences
that ensue in the ordinary and natural course of events"
from negligently inflicted property damage' 3 and (2) such
injuries should not be contemplated, in light of all the
circumstances, "as a natural and probable consequence" of
a negligently inflicted injury to property. 38
Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment and ruled
that, generally, 13 9 compensation will be denied when a plaintiff suffers
negligently inflicted emotional distress resulting from damage to
property.140
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Critique of Rationale
In Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,14'
the Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to hold a defendant
liable for emotional suffering which is allegedly caused by damage
to a plaintiff's property.142 The court correctly concluded that a
135. See Dobbins, 338 Md. at 350, 658 A.2d at 679.
136. 197 Md. 528, 539, 80 A.2d 13, 18 (1951); see also supra notes 73-80 and
accompanying text.
137. Dobbins, 338 Md. at 350, 658 A.2d at 679 (quoting State ex rel. Aronoff v.
Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md. 528, 539, 80 A.2d 13, 18 (1951)). "[P]roperty
damage is not the proximate cause of emotional injury .... I" d. at 351 n.3,
658 A.2d at 679 n.3.
138. Id. at 350-51, 658 A.2d at 679 (quoting Aronoff, 197 Md. at 539, 80 A.2d at
18). "[A] defendant has no duty to prevent emotional injuries flowing from
property damage." Id. at 351 n.3, 658 A.2d at 679 n.3.
139. The court acknowledged that if Ms. Dobbins had a reasonable fear for her
personal safety, this general rule would not apply. See id. at 351 n.4, 658 A.2d
at 680 n.4. Furthermore, if fraud, malice, or like motives exist, the general
rule does not apply. See id. at 346 n.2, 658 A.2d at 677 n.2 (quoting Zeigler
v. F Street Corp., 248 Md. 223, 226, 235 A.2d 703, 705 (1967)).
140. See id. at 351, 658 A.2d at 679-80.
141. 338 Md. 341, 658 A.2d 675 (1995).
142. See id.; see also Shipley, supra note 60, at 1089. Even cases decided after
Dobbins continue to deny plaintiffs compensation for negligent infliction of
emotional distress that stems solely from property damage. For example,
recently, in Kleinke v. Farmers Cooperative Supply & Shipping, 549 N.W.2d
714 (Wis. 1996), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied the plaintiffs recovery
for emotional suffering that resulted when their basement was negligently
flooded with 300 gallons of fuel. Basing its decision on public policy consid-
erations, the court "conclude[d] that it is unlikely that a plaintiff could ever
recover for the emotional distress caused by negligent damage to his or her
property." Id. at 716.
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plaintiff should be compensated only for foreseeable injuries. 143 The
only alternative to this approach is the direct tracing test, which
allows plaintiffs to recover for unforeseeable damages if directly
traceable to the negligent act.'" If this minority approach had been
adopted by the Maryland court, Ms. Dobbins might not have been
barred from recovery as a matter of law . 45 The court correctly
recognized, however, that only foreseeable injuries resulting from
negligence should be compensable. l
If the Maryland courts were to decide that a defendant could
be liable for injuries to a plaintiff that were unforeseeable, the
distinct difference between negligence and intentional tort principles
would be destroyed. Intentional tort law holds a defendant liable for
all injuries, both foreseeable and unforeseeable, resulting from the
intentional act. 147 If the minority approach were adopted, the court
would also hold a defendant liable for all injuries, both foreseeable
and unforeseeable, if they were directly traceable'" to the negligent
act. 149 Negligence cases, like Dobbins, are based on the principle of
fault; 150 therefore, a defendant should be held liable only for injuries
which were reasonably foreseeable at the time he breached his duty.' 5'
143. See Dobbins, 338 Md. at 348, 658 A.2d at 678. The court emphasized that the
goal of the foreseeability rules is to ensure that compensation will be denied
for injuries that are remote and unlikely. See id. (quoting Henley v. Prince
George's County, 305 Md. 320, 333, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986)).
144. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
145. The facts of the case indicate that Ms. Dobbins alleged that WSSC was
negligent in maintaining the water pipes and that the subsequent injuries to
Ms. Dobbins were a direct result of the floods to her residence. See Dobbins,
338 Md. at 342-44, 658 A.2d at 675-76 (emphasis added).
146. See id. at 350-51, 658 A.2d at 679.
147. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 8, at 37. "For an intended injury the
law is astute to discover even very remote causation." Derosier v. New England
Tel. Co., 130 A. 145, 152 (N.H. 1925).
148. See supra note 72 and accompanying text for explanation of directly traceable.
149. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 43, at 294. "The defendant is liable for
all such consequences of the defendant's negligence, although they were un-
foreseeable, and lie entirely beyond the scope of the risk created . .." Id.
150. See CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 43 (1980).
On the contrary, intentional tort cases are not based on fault or foreseeability.
Rather, the focus of intentional torts is on the "intent" of the defendant. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 8, at 33-37.
The three most basic elements of this most common usage of "intent"
are that (1) it is a state of mind (2) about consequences of an act (or
omission) and not about the act itself, and (3) it extends not only to
having in the mind a purpose (or desire) to bring about given con-
sequences but also to having in mind a belief (or knowledge) that
given consequences are substantially certain to result from the act.
Id. § 8, at 34.
151. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, at 281. Negligence "involves a foreseeable
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In denying compensation, the Dobbins court appropriately af-
firmed the use of the foreseeability rules. 152 The holding of the court
of appeals is nonetheless troublesome due to the court's misappli-
cation of the foreseeability rules. The problem stems from the court's
decision that, as a matter of law, emotional injuries resulting from
negligent property damage were unforeseeable.153 This decision is
consistent with the holding of State ex rel. Aronoff v. Baltimore
Transit Co.,"' a case that was ruled on over forty years ago.155 At
that time the court recognized that emotional injuries resulting from
negligently inflicted property damage were not foreseeable. 56 As
recognized in Belcher, over the past forty years society has become
more aware of the debilitating effects of a psychological condition.'
Consistent with this viewpoint is the rationale that forty years ago
an emotional injury resulting from property damage may not have
been foreseeable. As society becomes more educated, however, the
foreseeability window should also be expanded. 158 Several jurisdictions
have expanded the window of foreseeability by allowing juries to
determine if the emotional distress "was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's act."15 9 Nonetheless, the court of
risk, a threatened danger of injury, and conduct unreasonable in proportion
to the danger." Id. at 280. "[L]iability should extend to results further removed
when certain elements of fault were present." Derosier, 130 A. at 152-53.
152. See Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 338 Md. 341, 350,
658 A.2d 675, 679 (1995).
153. See id. at 350-51, 658 A.2d at 679-80.
154. 197 Md. 528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951).
155. This holding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Zeigler v.
F Street Corp., 248 Md. 223, 235 A.2d 703 (1967).
156. See Aronoff, 197 Md. at 539, 80 A.2d at 18. The Aronoff court noted that
psychological injuries are not "the consequences that ensue in the ordinary
and natural course of events" and cannot be "contemplated as a natural and
probable consequence thereof." Id. (quoting Baltimore City Passenger Ry. v.
Kemp, 61 Md. 74, 81 (1883)). The Court of Appeals of Maryland, if they so
desired, could have distinguished A ronoff and Zeigler, where the injured person
died, from Dobbins, where the injured person survived. The court could have
asserted that a death resulting from negligently inflicted property damage was
unforeseeable, while a psychological injury that did not result in death was
foreseeable. However, the court did not take this approach in Dobbins.
157. See Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found., Inc., 329 Md. 709, 735, 621 A.2d 872,
885 (1993). "The recognition that a person should be compensated for mental
harm resulting from the negligent act of another is in accord with the ever
increasing knowledge in the specialties which have evolved in the field of
medicine and in the disciplines of psychiatry and psychology." Id. at 735-36,
621 A.2d at 885.
158. This assertion is furthered by the fact that the court of appeals has also
recognized that mental injuries can be more disabling and "as real as broken
bones." Id. at 736, 621 A.2d at 885.
159. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 521 (Haw. 1970); see also supra notes 62-
67 and accompanying text.
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appeals chose to follow the traditional approach, keeping the fore-
seeability window unmodified, even after acknowledging the societal
metamorphosis that has occurred over the last forty years.
1'0
One of the most compelling arguments supporting the court's
viewpoint is the risk of opening the floodgates of litigation and
placing a "strain on all bounds of credibility."' 6' Nonetheless, this
fear has not materialized in Hawaii, a jurisdiction that has abandoned
the traditional approach. 62 The Supreme Court of Hawaii noted that
since their decision to allow compensation for mental distress resulting
from negligently inflicted destruction of property "there has been no
'plethora of similar cases'; the fears of unlimited liability have not
proved true." 163
Furthermore, the jurisdictions that have abolished the traditional
rule have extended foreseeability well beyond damage to residential
property. 16 For example, the Supreme Court of Hawaii extended
foreseeability to a situation where a family dog, considered by law
to be personal property, 16 died due to the negligence of the animal
quarantine station.'" The supreme court affirmed the trial court's
holding that emotional distress damages resulting from the negligent
destruction of property is compensable. 167
B. Future Implications
The holding in Dobbins will greatly benefit future defendants
and their insurance companies, while placing a significant roadblock
in front of future plaintiffs who suffer emotional injuries after
160. See Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 338 Md. 341, 351,
658 A.2d 675, 679-80 (1995).
161. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981).
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Knowles Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Willis, 360 So. 2d 37, 38-39 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066,
1071 (Haw. 1981).
165. "The law clearly views a dog as personal property." Campbell, 632 P.2d at
1071 n.5 (citing Thiele v. City of Denver, 312 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1957); Smith
v. Costello, 290 P.2d 742 (Idaho 1955)).
166. See id. at 1067. The animal quarantine station was transporting the dog by
van to a local veterinarian to remove a growth on the dog's gums. See id.
Due to the lack of ventilation in the van where the dog was located, the pet
died of heat prostration. See id. Upon notification of the death, the whole
family, except the father, cried. See id. Furthermore, for the next two weeks
the whole family suffered severe emotional distress resulting from the loss of
their pet. See id. The plaintiffs never sought the assistance of medical or
psychiatric professionals. See id. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
for $1000. See id.
167. See id. at 1071. This court allowed the trier of fact to determine if the
emotional distress was proximately caused by the defendants' negligent conduct.
See id.
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damage to their property. In the future, in order for a plaintiff to
recover, the facts must fall within one of the exceptions outlined in
Zeigler v. F Street Corp. 168 These exceptions include fraud, malice,
intentional conduct, and danger to the plaintiff's personal safety.
69
Therefore, under Maryland law, a trial court will most likely deny
recovery to future plaintiff's unless they allege and prove one of
these exceptions.
A future plaintiff may be able to strengthen their claim for
compensation if the facts of their case indicate that the plaintiff
witnessed the negligent destruction of property as it happened. If the
plaintiff witnesses the damage as it occurs, a court may be more
inclined to view the aftereffects of this damage as foreseeable. 70
While the current law in Maryland does not indicate that these facts
would automatically result in compensation, this type of argument
could aid in satisfying the foreseeability requirement. 171
Future plaintiffs might also strengthen their case for recovery if
they allege that the defendant's conduct became a nuisance and
interfered with their physical comfort while they were using their
property. 72 For example, in Edwards v. Talent Irrigation District, 
1
7
the Supreme Court of Oregon allowed plaintiffs to recover for
emotional injuries stemming solely from property damage because
the defendant's negligent conduct interfered with the use and enjoy-
ment of the plaintiffs' property.
74
In Edwards, the plaintiffs alleged emotional damages after the
defendant's irrigation ditch, which was damaged, flooded the plain-
tiffs' property. 171 As a result of the flooding, the plaintiffs were
distressed about the loss of the use of their bathing and laundry
facilities and the need to spend hours fixing and draining their
168. 248 Md. 223, 226, 235 A.2d 703, 705 (1967).
169. See id. (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages § 68 (1966)).
170. In Hawaii, a jurisdiction that allows compensation for emotional distress as a
result of property damage, a defendant tried to escape liability by asserting
that the plaintiff was not an eyewitness to the tortious event that caused the
property damage. See Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1069. The Supreme Court of
Hawaii rejected this argument explaining that a defendant will be liable whether
a plaintiff actually observes the tortious accident or the consequences that
resulted from the tortious accident. See id. This holding demonstrates that
Hawaii courts recognize that both of these situations can create a foreseeable
emotional injury. Therefore, they did not need to implement this distinction.
171. A plaintiff in Maryland who could convince the court of the need to expand
the foreseeability window could recommend this distinction as a way to
compensate a plaintiff for their mental injuries as a result of negligent destruc-
tion of property.
172. See Shipley, supra note 60, at 1087-89.
173. 570 P.2d 1169 (Or. 1977).
174. See id. at 1169.
175. See id.
[Vol. 26
19961 Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission 245
property.'7 6 Thus, the court concluded that it was proper for them
to be compensated for their emotional injuries. 177
The Edwards holding might provide assistance to future plaintiffs
in Maryland. In Dobbins, the plaintiffs mentioned the Edwards case
in their brief to the court of appeals, but they did not focus on the
nuisance theory. 7 Future plaintiffs might bring a successful claim if
they attempt to emphasize that the defendant's negligent conduct
interfered with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property.
Even though Dobbins clearly favors future defendants, one
benefit for future plaintiffs stemming from Belcher, and reiterated
in Dobbins, is the relaxation of the "physical injury" rule. 79 The
Belcher court's statement that "[w]e are now aware that mental
injuries can be as real as broken bones and may result in even greater
disabilities"'' 0 indicates that Maryland courts may be headed toward
the minority approach that allows recovery for mental injuries even
if the emotional distress does not result in a subsequent "physical
injury.'' 1 Indeed, courts that have adopted this approach use similar
wording to support the need to relax or abolish the "physical injury"
rule.182 Under this minority approach, plaintiffs need to show only
176. See id. at 1170.
177. See id. Nonetheless, in a footnote, the court explained that their holding was
limited to this particular type of case. See id. at 1170 n.4. The Supreme Court
of Oregon recognized that the law dealing with the recovery for mental distress
"is confused and perhaps in need of rethinking by the courts." Id. The court,
however, stated that the Edwards case was not "a proper vehicle for reconsid-
eration of the rules governing recovery for this type of injury." Id.
178. See Appellants' Brief at 9, Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n,
338 Md. 341, 658 A.2d 675 (1995) (Sept. Term 1994 No. 122). The appellants
placed this case in a string citation after making the general assertion that
"[c]ourts in other jurisdictions have allowed recovery for damages for emotional
distress based on property damage." Id.
179. See Dobbins, 338 Md. at 350, 658 A.2d at 679 (quoting Belcher v. T. Rowe
Price Found., Inc., 329 Md. 709, 735-36, 621 A.2d 872, 885 (1993)). For a
discussion of the "physical injury" rule see supra notes 21-57 and accompanying
text.
180. Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found., Inc., 329 Md. 709, 736, 621 A.2d 872, 885
(1993).
181. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
182. For example, in St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex.
1987), overruled on other grounds by Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595-96
(Tex. 1993), the Supreme Court of Texas abolished the physical injury rule
and stated: "It is well recognized that certain psychological injuries can be just
as severe and debilitating as physical injuries." Garrard, 730 S.W.2d at 653.
See supra note 29 for a detailed discussion of the effect of Boyles on the
holding of Garrard. Likewise, in Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found., Inc., 329
Md. 709, 736, 621 A.2d 872, 885 (1993), the Court of Appeals of Maryland
stated: "We are now aware that mental injuries can be as real as broken bones
and may result in even greater disabilities." Arguably, the language in Belcher
is stronger than the language in St. Elizabeth Hospital.
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mental anguish to satisfy the injury requirement.18 1 The assertion that
this approach may open the floodgates of litigation should not be a
reason to deny compensation for mental suffering.'"
V. CONCLUSION
The Dobbins decision is an example of the modern dilemma that
courts, including Maryland, experience when trying to determine how
far they will extend emotional distress damages. In Dobbins, the
court of appeals reaffirmed that Maryland courts will not permit
recovery for mental injuries that are unforeseeable. 185 More specifi-
cally, the court rejected the minority view that compensates a plaintiff
when a defendant's conduct results in the negligent infliction of
emotional distress .186 The court recognized the liberalization of the
"physical injury" rule requirement but refused to extend the liber-
alization to the foreseeability requirement. 1a7 This failure to relax the
foreseeability requirement is inconsistent with the court's acknow-
ledgment that the advancement in medical technology has increased
society's awareness and knowledge regarding psychological injuries. 88
Future plaintiffs should use this acknowledgement to argue that
psychological injuries are equally as foreseeable as physical injuries.
Scott A. Mirsky
183. See Garrard, 730 S.W.2d at 654, overruled on other grounds by Boyles v.
Ker, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (Tex. 1993). See supra note 29 for a detailed
discussion of the effect of Boyles on the holding of Garrard. In Garrard, the
court held that jurors have the responsibility to determine if the plaintiff's
mental anguish was caused by the defendant's actions. See Garrard, 730 S.W.2d
at 654, overruled on other grounds by Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595-
96 (Tex. 1993). See supra note 29 for a detailed discussion of the effect of
Boyles on the holding of Garrard.
184. See id. The court in Garrard recognized this potential problem. See id. The
court, however, asserted that this obstacle cannot stand in the way of com-
pensating legitimate claims. See id. at 653-54. The court stated: "The problem
is one of proof, and to deny a remedy in all cases because some claims may
be false leads to arbitrary results which do not serve the best interests of the
public." Id. at 654.
185. See supra notes 100-40 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 60-72, 141-67 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 91-99, 134-40, 179-84 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
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